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Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World 
Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to 
commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation 
in international trade agreements. This paper examines 
the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge 
poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic 
costs and externality implications of this failure. Given 
the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization 
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rules and disciplines against small and poor members, 
bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade 
Organization is important for making trade agreements 
more relevant to trade constituencies in developing 
countries. Although the paper focuses on the World 
Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to 
reciprocal North-South trade agreements.  
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errors are our own. 1   Introduction 
Research on developing country engagement in the international trading system increasingly 
challenges its relevance for their economic interests and performance.
1 Within this area of 
research, there is a growing political-legal-economic literature analyzing the failure of poor 
member countries to engage actively in the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially 
through formal legal participation in WTO dispute settlement provisions. Most analysis of poor 
countries’ lack of engagement in WTO dispute settlement focuses on hurdles to participation as 
complainants or interested third parties in disputes related to their export market access 
interests.
2  For example, only one least developed country (LDC) has ever initiated WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings: Bangladesh in a 2004 case against India involving Indian anti-dumping 
duties on lead acid batteries (WTO/DS/306).
3   
The focus on defending export interests ignores a dimension of the dispute settlement 
process that may be more important for developing countries and the economic development 
relevance of the WTO: developing countries in the WTO system are rarely challenged as 
respondents in WTO litigation. As table 1 indicates, through the end of 2006, only two low-
income WTO members (India and Pakistan) have been formally challenged by WTO litigation. 
Put more starkly, of the more than 350 formal WTO dispute settlement cases through 2006, none 
of the 32 WTO members classified by the United Nations as LDCs have been challenged. 
As it is unlikely that poor countries are in full compliance with their trade liberalization 
commitments, the failure of WTO members to enforce the provisions of trade agreements 
reduces the value of participation in such agreements for these countries. Lack of enforcement 
reduces economic gains from WTO membership for several reasons: welfare economic losses 
due to continued import protection within developing economies; diminished incentives for the 
country to take on additional WTO commitments such as reducing tariff bindings to meaningful 
                                                           
1 The frustration of developing countries in the WTO more broadly is captured in Fatoumata and Kwa (2004). For 
an economic dissection of what developing countries might realistically expect to achieve out of the WTO, see 
Staiger (2006). For economic appraisals of the ineffectiveness and unintended consequences of the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) and other forms of special and differential treatment (SDT), see Ismail (2006), Keck 
and Low (2006), Ozden and Reinhardt (2004, 2005) and Subramanian and Wei (2007). 
 
2 Examples from the economics literature include Bown and Hoekman (2005), Bown (2005a, b), Horn, Mavroidis 
and Nordström (2005), and Nordström (2005). Examples from politics and legal scholarship include Davis and 
Bermeo (2006), Busch and Reinhardt (2003) and Shaffer (2006). 
 
3 This case was settled in the consultations stage (Taslim, 2006). See Horn and Mavroidis (2006) and their database 
on WTO disputes at www.worldbank.org/trade/WTOdisputes. levels (i.e., at or close to applied rates); as well as externality costs imposed on other developing 
countries. 
There are a number of possible explanations why WTO members do not challenge poor 
countries. First, poor countries have made only a limited number of market access commitments 
in the WTO, and they can invoke various provisions that offer them special and differential 
treatment (SDT) when it comes to application of specific rules. Second, litigation is expensive in 
economic terms (resource costs), and the potential gains to foreign exporters in terms of 
increased market access from winning a case may be too small to compensate for the cost of 
litigation. Third, litigation is also politically expensive – many governments, especially high-
income nations, may prefer not to be seen as “picking on” a poor country for WTO violations. 
While developing countries can invoke SDT provisions and many have not bound a large 
number of their nonagricultural tariffs in the WTO,
4 the concern we focus on in this paper is that 
even if a poor country decides to make full use of the WTO as a commitment mechanism, the 
current system makes enforcement unlikely. This in turn implies that developing countries are 
not realizing the full economic benefits of WTO membership, and may help explain why 
commitments by developing countries are more limited than those of industrialized economies. 
The maintained assumption in this paper is that implementation of negotiated 
commitments is desirable from a national welfare perspective, especially when it comes to the 
core disciplines of the WTO that are unambiguously welfare enhancing: tariff bindings, bans on 
the use of quotas, and the principle of nondiscrimination. Non-enforcement of these types of 
disciplines greatly reduces the relevance and benefits of membership in a trade agreement.  
We recognize that in practice, non-enforcement of some WTO rules may be welfare 
enhancing for a developing country. A case in point is the TRIPS agreement, where the short-run 
welfare benefit of implementation of commitments by some developing countries has been 
questioned by numerous analysts. An implication of the weak dispute settlement-cum-
enforcement incentives in the case of small/poor countries is that many such WTO members will 
have “policy space” on a de facto basis. Proponents of greater policy space in the WTO context 
therefore might argue that the skewed incentive structure for enforcement under the WTO – 
which requires a minimum “size threshold” to be satisfied – is appropriate. The effect of the 
                                                           
4 Every WTO member was required to bind all agricultural tariffs as a precondition for accession to the WTO. For a 
discussion, see Hoekman and Kostecki (2001). 
 
  2incentive structure that drives WTO dispute settlement is to ensure that in practice governments 
of small developing countries may have significant policy flexibility, even in areas where in 
principle they are bound to multilateral disciplines.  
Insofar as non-enforcement of WTO rules would be beneficial for a country, the de facto 
policy space that is implied by a lack of enforcement is in our view symptomatic of another 
problem: badly designed rules and commitments. The appropriate remedy is to re-negotiate the 
rules or to seek waivers, and not to rely on the low probability of being confronted with a 
dispute. Developing countries that desire greater policy flexibility should negotiate this directly.  
Similarly, in a number of policy areas affecting trade that are not yet subject to binding 
multilateral rules there may well be a good case for cooperation that is not associated with 
binding, enforceable commitments (Hoekman, 2005). Explicit agreement (based on negotiations) 
to define mutually acceptable rules of the game is the appropriate mechanism to enhance the 
“development relevance” of the WTO. The status quo – de facto exemption from WTO dispute 
settlement – is not. 
In addition to highlighting the potential costs created by a lack of enforcement, this paper 
also raises questions about the applicability of the economic theory used to explain the formation 
of trade agreements, and in particular, the case of WTO membership for small, poor countries. 
One strand of the theory (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1999, 2002) stresses terms-of-trade effects as 
the driving force underpinning cooperation between countries on trade and related policies. The 
argument is that countries negotiate away the negative terms-of-trade externalities that would be 
created by the imposition of trade restrictions in partner countries. A legitimate economic 
question to ask from the perspective of this theory is, if a country is small and unable to affect 
prices (in the terms of trade sense) as we might expect for many developing countries; what does 
such a country stand to gain from a trade agreement? That is, why does it “need” the WTO at 
all?
5 A partial, and yet incomplete, answer to this question is that the government of the small 
country would like to join the WTO because its exporters stand to benefit from the low tariffs 
that large WTO member countries negotiate reciprocally with one another but must then extend 
to all other members under the most favored nation (MFN) rule.
6 But the terms-of-trade strand of 
                                                           
5 I.e., a small country should have an economic welfare incentive to open up its market to imports unilaterally. 
 
6 This answer is incomplete because it does not explain why large countries want small countries to join the WTO. 
 
  3theory does not explain why small country governments negotiate limits on their own use of 
import tariffs and other policies when joining such a trade agreement. 
A second strand of economic theory (e.g., Tumlir, 1985; Staiger and Tabellini, 1987; 
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998, forthcoming) indicates a potential commitment device benefit 
for small, poor country governments that limit their own use of trade policy by negotiating entry 
into trade agreements. This line of theory has the agreement serving as a lock-in mechanism or 
anchor for trade and related policy reforms. By committing to certain rules that bind policies, a 
government can make its reforms more credible; officials can tell interest groups seeking the 
imposition of policies that violate the commitments that doing so would result in retaliation by 
trading partners. However, if the agreement is unlikely to be enforced in practice because it does 
not create adequate follow-through incentives, the political-economy explanation for cooperation 
breaks down. Why then do we observe such reciprocal trade agreements in the first place?
7 
  The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a very simple economic 
framework to illustrate the economic problems associated with a failure to enforce WTO 
commitments, and discusses evidence on the on the use of antidumping and the effectiveness of 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a commitment device. In section 3 we 
assess a range of alternative institutional approaches to “enforce” commitments under the current 
dispute settlement system, highlighting the problems associated with each.  Section 4 discusses 
alternative, transparency-based approaches to address the problems associated with the current 
weak incentives to enforce the commitments of poor countries. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2    Implications of the Mechanics of WTO Enforcement 
To illustrate the problems that arise in enforcing a developing country’s WTO commitments, 
consider a two country economic model with three actors: an importing industry (or consumer 
interests) and an import-competing industry in the developing country of interest, and one 
exporting industry in a foreign country. For simplicity, we represent the two countries as taking 
on WTO commitments by assuming that each agrees to free trade. 
                                                           
7 See also the discussion in Bagwell and Staiger (2002, p. 4). While our discussion below is framed in terms of the 
WTO, the issues are more general; they apply to the incentives generated within most reciprocal, North-South trade 
agreements. 
 
  4Assume for concreteness that the importing interest group in the developing country is an 
industry C that relies on some imported intermediates as part of its production process.
8 Typical 
examples might be a clothing industry that requires imports of textiles; auto producers or the 
construction industry that require imports of steel, etc.  Industry C could produce a non-tradable 
(e.g., construction) or a good that is traded as either an exportable or that also competes in the 
domestic market with imports (not modeled). A second industry P in the developing country 
produces goods that compete with the imported intermediate product from F – i.e., P also 
produces the steel or textiles that can be used as inputs in downstream industry C. Thus the 
developing country industry P competes directly with foreign industry F, but it does not compete 
with industry C.  
To illustrate the potential role for an institution like the WTO, consider the following 
typical policy scenario. In the face of import competition from F, industry P in the developing 
country lobbies for protection from imports, which policymakers grant in some WTO-
inconsistent manner.
9 The imposition of this new import restriction has the standard welfare-
economic implications for the developing country as it raises the production costs to developing 
country industry C. If the policy is imposed as a tariff, the industry may be able to continue 
sourcing from its preferred foreign supplier industry F, but at a higher cost. Alternatively, it can 
switch to the domestic competitor P, which it was not entirely sourcing from before the import 
restriction because it was more costly, the industry offered a lower quality variety, the industry 
was capacity-constrained, etc.  
Whatever its sourcing choice, the implication is that developing country industry C will 
have to reduce production because of the higher cost associated with the import restriction, and 
this will lead to either a reduction in wages or laying off workers, as the industry is less 
competitive. The effect of this reduced competitiveness may be strongest if C produces a 
tradable product, as any (not-modeled) foreign competition that it faces could still source inputs 
from the lower cost foreign industry F.
 A simple economic welfare analysis would most 
frequently reveal that not only is the domestic consuming industry harmed by this import 
                                                           
8 The analysis of interest group C representing final consumers (households) is similar, with the exception that in 
general it will be more difficult for consumers to organize. 
9 The form of the WTO-inconsistent protection that eliminates market access is immaterial – it could take the form 
of an inappropriate application of domestic antidumping or safeguard law, imposition of a tariff in violation of the 
country’s Article II bindings, a quantitative restriction, or some other non-tariff barrier to trade. 
 
  5restriction, but the losses it suffers are larger than the gains to the other domestic industry P, and 
thus this policy is welfare-reducing from the perspective of the economy as a whole. 
In many countries, the existing domestic institutional process will not allow for industry 
C to voice its concerns regarding the implications of requests for import restrictions by industry 
P.
10  If so, there is a potential efficiency-enhancing role for an external institution, such as the 
WTO.
11  The “enforcement” that is provided by the WTO comes through its role as an 
intermediary. The existence of the WTO establishes a forum where foreign industry F – the 
exporter of the intermediate inputs that has also been harmed by the WTO-inconsistent trade 
restriction that has shut off its market access – engages its government to file and pursue a 
dispute on its behalf. If successful, the foreign government undertaking a dispute on behalf of 
industry F will also be working in the interest of developing country industry C (or, more 
generally, consumers). Furthermore, the dispute is likely to be valued by the developing 
country’s own government, which did not have the ability to implement its preferred policy in 
the absence of the commitment power facilitated by the WTO.  
How does the initiation of a trade dispute ultimately benefit industry C and the 
developing country? To illustrate, we sketch out the classic political-legal-economic path to 
WTO dispute resolution. First, F’s government makes legal arguments before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), and it convinces a Panel and then (if there is an appeal) the Appellate 
Body that the developing country government’s import restriction was WTO-inconsistent. In 
order to enforce the commitment when industry P’s government still refuses to comply, the 
WTO process allows for F’s government to demand the rebalancing of concessions and to 
                                                           
10 This is frequently the case when it comes to antidumping or safeguard laws, for example. The statutes and 
domestic institutions set up to administer the injury investigation do not allow for a consumer interest role in the 
process. For a discussion see Finger (2002). 
 
11 Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) illustrate a commitment role for the WTO in a formal economic model, 
suggesting it can be welfare-improving even for a small country when the domestic government has a weak 
bargaining position relative to domestic lobbies. Without the commitment power provided by the WTO, the 
government imposes distortionary trade restrictions and is compensated with rents extracted from the lobbies. 
However, when the government has a weak bargaining position the resulting rents are small, and even a small 
country’s government would prefer to introduce a trade agreement like the WTO. The agreement allows the 
government to commit to trade liberalization, yielding long run improvements in national welfare associated with 
efficient resource allocation that are large enough to compensate it for the lost rents. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 
(forthcoming) introduce an extended model which explores the tradeoffs facing a government with an incentive to 
sign a trade agreement for both the terms-of-trade and commitment motives. Staiger and Tabellini (1987) provide 
alternative arguments for a commitment role for the WTO by showing how a domestic government with income 
redistribution motives can benefit from external enforcement when it seeks to implement an optimal policy of free 
trade that is time-inconsistent. 
 
  6receive authorization from the WTO to retaliate by raising its tariffs to reduce the market access 
toward imports from the respondent developing country. This retaliation threat activates political 
pressure within the developing country as its exporters (not modeled) mobilize in self-interest to 
convince the respondent government to get rid of the WTO-inconsistent import restriction 
adversely affecting industry F (and C).
 The moral of the commitment role story is that foreign 
industry F is there to “rescue” consumer interests via WTO dispute settlement,
12 in the process 
also enhancing overall economic welfare in the developing country.
13 
  In order for the WTO to provide a poor country with the efficiency-enhancing, 
enforcement-cum-commitment role posited by economic theorists, a foreign industry F must 
actively engage. In practice, however, there are a number of reasons why no such foreign 
industry may invoke the enforcement mechanism. First, if the developing country market is 
small, foreign industry F may not even attempt to convince its government to file a WTO trade 
dispute, because the resource costs of litigation exceed the potential market access benefits. 
Second, even if the industry were willing to absorb the economic costs of pursuing a case 
because the developing country market was sufficiently large, the international political costs for 
the foreign government of pursuing a trade dispute against a poor country may be too high 
relative to the expected benefits.
14 In the current WTO system, if no foreign government/industry 
F pair combination engages, potential disputes do not get filed and the WTO fails to provide an 
external enforcement device. 
                                                           
12 Note that there is nothing here to suggest that this story is limited to industries C and P in developing countries. 
For example, let P be the US steel industry, C be the US steel-consuming industry, let F be steel producers in the 
EU, and let the policy in question be the 2002 US steel safeguard. One economic interpretation of the WTO trade 
dispute concerning that policy was that the EU’s effective use of retaliation threats contributed to the US terminating 
the WTO-inconsistent safeguard to the benefit of the US steel-consuming industries and US economic welfare. 
From this perspective, the paradoxical implication is that developed countries such as the US are using the WTO to 
improve their economic welfare by “losing” (legally) such WTO trade disputes on a regular basis. 
 
13 For reasons of domestic politics, the WTO is not likely to receive credit from the domestic government for taking 
on this role. Most likely the government will place the blame on the WTO in order to deflect political pressure 
levied by industry P. Furthermore, external critics may charge that the WTO is a non-democratic, supra-national 
bully forcing an unwelcome policy change on the developing country, as they fail to recognize the developing 
country is simply changing its policy back to one it had voluntarily committed itself to by agreeing to WTO 
membership. 
 
14 There are a number of other contributing factors, including that the foreign government may not file a case of 
market access interest to its exporters because it lacks the imports from the developing country in question. Under 
the current “retaliation as compensation” approach, imports are a necessary condition to establish the credible 
retaliatory threat needed to mobilize exporting interests in the developing country needed to convince the 
government to remove the initial import restriction (Bown 2004a,b). 
 
  7  The above concern complements the terms-of-trade strand of the research literature on 
trade agreements. Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) model the WTO as an institutional 
framework where “large” countries balance reciprocal market-access concessions to neutralize 
the terms-of-trade effects of their policy changes. From this perspective, the failure of any self-
interested party to engage actively to enforce poor country WTO commitments comes into 
sharper relief.  A small developing country that raises its tariff in a WTO-inconsistent manner 
may go unchallenged because it is unlikely that it both (i) imports in sufficient volume that its 
tariff imposes an external cost on a trading partner that is large enough to induce the partner to 
seek to offset it by raising its own tariff (via authorized retaliation after a trade dispute), and (ii) 
exports in sufficient volume to that partner so that such a retaliatory tariff would lead to the 
partner’s own terms-of-trade gain. 
 
2.1    Additional concerns with the failure to enforce WTO commitments 
The foregoing considerations are not the only economic implications when poor country 
commitments are not enforced. There may also be important dynamic costs and externality 
concerns. 
First, if we assume that industry leaders are rational and forward thinking, industry C 
recognizes that there will be a lack of follow-through when it comes to enforcement of WTO 
rules. Even with the institutional framework in place, the political-economic incentives and 
environment may make it infeasible for foreign industries F to pursue cases. An implication is 
that when industry C considers how much political capital to allocate to convince its government 
to liberalize import markets, it will under-invest. The industry recognizes that there will be no 
active enforcement at the WTO of the market-access commitments that it would have to spend 
resources to convince its government to take on. The same dynamic will arise, but even more 
strongly, in the case of consumers more generally. 
Second, consider the case of a large developing country, and the question of whether it is 
likely to be able to use an agreement such as the WTO to escape from its terms-of-trade driven 
prisoner’s dilemma. Foreign governments, especially of high-income countries, that are potential 
negotiating partners may fear a public outcry if they initiate a future trade dispute in an effort to 
enforce the developing country’s concessions. In such an environment, potential partners may be 
less willing to negotiate reciprocal concessions with even large developing countries in the first 
  8place. Combined, these two problems associated with the disincentive to engage developing 
country governments may help explain why tariff bindings and services liberalization 
commitments in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) tend to be limited for 
many developing countries.  
  Third, it is important to consider the welfare implications for the exporting country 
industry, F. Suppose exporters in other developing countries are also disproportionately the 
target of developing country trade restrictions that are not being challenged at the WTO, and, by 
extension, the developing country market access liberalization commitments that are not being 
made because of the lack of expected enforcement. If so, an additional concern may arise. In the 
self-enforcing WTO system, we expect developing country exporters to be targeted 
disproportionately for a number of reasons, including their limited retaliatory and legal 
capacities. Such limitations are likely to discourage the exporters’ government’s willingness and 
ability to engage in the WTO dispute resolution process to enforce their expected export market 
access, independent of whether the potential respondent is also a developing country.
15 
  While the economic welfare implications of failing to challenge developing country 
action are first order in importance, there are additional institutional implications worth 
discussing. For example, Davis and Bermeo (2006) show that a developing country that has been 
challenged is more likely to subsequently challenge other WTO members in defense of its own 
export market access interests. In this manner, there may be  “learning by doing,” i.e., facing a 
dispute as a respondent may eliminate some hurdles to participation and increase the likelihood 
that a developing country will engage in the dispute settlement process as a complainant. 
This institutional externality is another area where the WTO principle of reciprocity 
emerges. For political reasons, getting an external commitment mechanism like the WTO to 
work to enforce domestic reform likely requires that countries have a relatively balanced 
portfolio of WTO cases to show to their constituencies – some that they “win” on the 
complainant side through increased market access for their exporters, and some that they “win” 
(by “losing”) on the respondent side where they agree to live up to import market liberalization 
commitments that are being enforced. Political sustainability of the WTO as an institution may 
require a balanced set of realistic expectations of what the organization, which coordinates a 
                                                           
15 In a sample of data including WTO-inconsistent policies imposed by both developed and developing countries, 
Bown (2005b) presents evidence that such variables affect the incentives of adversely affected exporters to engage 
in formal WTO dispute settlement.  
  9balance of concessions across countries, can do. If expectations for what the WTO can feasibly 
accomplish for a country become unrealistic, it will ultimately turn out to be a failure in the eyes 
of the public, thus undermining the institutional sustainability and the efficiency-enhancing 
economic welfare benefits generated by the system.  
To summarize, the failure of the current enforcement model – i.e., the failure of WTO 
members to challenge developing countries that do not live up to market access commitments – 
may give rise to at least four potentially important economic problems from the perspective of 
developing countries. First, it imposes welfare costs on the economy and losses to consumers and 
consuming industries that are larger than the gains enjoyed by domestic producers that would 
otherwise have to compete with imports. Second, it creates an environment where domestic 
industries in developing countries do not face the socially optimal incentives to invest their 
political capital in trade liberalization because they foresee that liberalization commitments will 
not be enforced. Third, foreign governments may be unwilling to negotiate reciprocally with 
even “large” developing countries in need of escape from a terms-of-trade driven prisoner’s 
dilemma if such governments anticipate a future environment in which they are politically 
unable to enforce a poor country partner’s commitments. Fourth, developing countries may be 
imposing new and unchallenged import restrictions that disproportionately affect the potential 
exports of other developing countries. 
 
2.2   Evidence  
In this section we briefly discuss empirical research and newly available sources of data 
supporting these concerns, focusing on the global use of antidumping, developing country use of 
GATS as a commitment device, and some evidence that commitments matter for a country’s 
trade performance. As noted in the Introduction, the prima facie “stylized fact” that underpins 
our argument is that small/poor developing countries are challenged only very infrequently in the 
WTO.  
 
2.2.1   Developing country use of antidumping and other trade remedies 
The first question is whether developing countries are imposing potentially challengeable, WTO-
inconsistent import restrictions. One data source suggesting an answer to this question is 
members’ potentially WTO-inconsistent application of trade remedies such as antidumping and 
  10countervailing duties, as well as safeguard measures. As Table 2 indicates, some of the heaviest 
users of trade remedies such as antidumping are now developing economies. At the same time 
that the use of trade remedies has proliferated across the WTO membership, the application of 
trade remedies increasingly faces legal challenges through formal WTO dispute settlement. 
Indeed, Table 3 indicates that almost half of the WTO disputes initiated between 1999 and 2006 
involved challenges to trade remedies. Furthermore, in most trade-remedy cases that make it 
through the panel process, the Dispute Settlement Body has found some WTO-inconsistent 
element of the investigation undertaken and/or measure imposed by the respondent country.
16 
Thus there is little evidence from the WTO caseload that a country that applies a trade remedy is 
likely to have it ruled as being consistent with its WTO obligations. 
  Given this context, one particularly interesting feature of the data is that a developing 
country’s use of a trade remedy is unlikely to be formally challenged under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU). For example, developing countries are some of the most 
frequent new users of antidumping. If we assume developing country government agencies are 
just as likely as developed countries to apply WTO-inconsistent measures,
17 we would expect 
many of these measures to be challenged at the WTO. While the data in the right hand column of 
Table 2 suggest that some developing country use of antidumping is being challenged by WTO 
litigation, the number of challenges is small – especially when we consider that over half (38 of 
69) of the challenges reported in the table were brought up in only two disputes (DS304 and 
DS318) against India that never made it past the stage of the EU and Taiwan requesting 
consultations. For the most part, the explosion in developing economy use of newly-imposed and 
potentially WTO-inconsistent antidumping measures is going unchallenged by WTO litigation. 
  There are many possible reasons why developing country use of antidumping is going 
unchallenged by formal WTO trade disputes. As a specific example, Bown’s (2006a) cross-
country study of determinants of DSU challenges to the use of antidumping presents evidence, 
consistent with the concerns raised here, that an antidumping measure is less likely to be 
challenged the smaller is the value of export market access lost to the measure. Exporters are 
                                                           
16 For a review of some of the jurisprudence, see Cunningham and Crib (2003), Durling (2003) and Sykes (2003). 
 
17 There is little ex ante reason to expect that the investigative agencies in developing countries are more likely than 
those in the US or EU, for example, to implement a WTO-consistent investigative procedure and apply a WTO-
consistent trade restriction. If anything, given the lack of historical familiarity with the interaction between national 
trade remedy laws and GATT/WTO law, one would expect developing countries to be more likely than developed 
countries to implement measures that are inconsistent with WTO obligations. 
  11unlikely to spend the resource costs of pursuing WTO litigation if the expected market access 
gains from winning the case against a developing country respondent are small.  
Finally, data in Table 4 suggest that some of the major targets of poor country use of 
antidumping are exporters in other developing countries. The table presents detailed information 
from five of the largest developing country antidumping users regarding the foreign exporters 
that they most frequently target with imposition of new trade restrictions.  Not surprisingly, 
China is each antidumping user’s first or second most-frequent target, despite being no higher 
than the fourth biggest source of imports for any one of these developing countries. Furthermore, 
each of these countries substantially targets other developing country exporters with their use of 
antidumping, frequently out of proportion to the country’s overall share of the user’s import 
market, as is the case with China.
18  
 
2.2.2   Evidence from the GATS 
Other suggestive evidence comes from transition economies that acceded to the WTO after 1995. 
Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) compare GATS commitments with the evolution of actual 
policy stances over time in 16 transition countries, using an index of service sector policy 
compiled by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Over half of the 
16 transition countries are economies that had the prospect of accession to the EU. No such 
country made very deep commitments in the GATS, and in practice all are much more open than 
their GATS commitments suggest. This indicates that these countries did not see a need to use 
the GATS as a means to commit to liberalization. Instead, they appear to have relied on other 
mechanisms, in particular the EU acquis communautaire, as a focal point and lock-in device. 
In contrast, many of the transition countries that were not EU accession candidates score 
high in terms of GATS commitments. This group includes Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. All these countries have 
little or no chance of joining the EU in the near future, which presumably helps to explain why 
the depth and coverage of their GATS commitments is much greater than that of other transition 
economies as well as most WTO members. With the exception of Macedonia, they are 
geographically or culturally distant from the EU, have small markets, and were not GATT 
                                                           
18 For the reasons posited in Bown and Hoekman (2005), the fact that the exporters are also in developing countries 
may contribute to the explanation of why developing country WTO violations are going unchallenged, as was 
reported in table 2. 
  12members in 1994. Yet although these countries made many commitments in the GATS, they 
score low on the EBRD index of actual services policies. The GATS appears to have been either 
a failure for these countries –  not helping to promote improvements in services policies in the 
period following accession – or irrelevant in the sense that governments made commitments that 
they either did not intend to implement or could implement without a significant change in actual 
policies. Thus, for many of the non-EU accession candidates – especially those in Central Asia – 
the WTO appears to be a weak commitment device. One explanation is that the small size of the 
potential markets concerned generates weak external enforcement incentives. 
 
2.2.3   Evidence that commitments matter 
While we are not aware of any empirical studies examining whether the failure to enforce 
commitments is a cause of developing countries failing to take on GATT/WTO commitments in 
the first place, we can point to research suggesting that taking on commitments itself matters for 
a country’s economic performance. Subramanian and Wei (2007) show that while the WTO has, 
on average, promoted trade of member countries, the size of this impact varies substantially 
across countries. From the perspective of this paper, their most compelling result is that WTO 
members that did not commit to actual applied tariff reductions in the Uruguay Round saw no 
greater average increase in trade than countries that are not even WTO members.
19 However, 
Francois and Martin (2004) develop a theoretical model to explore the value to a country of 
making tariff-binding commitments even if these are higher than the level of the applied tariff. 
They show that the value is positive because bindings reduce uncertainty regarding the expected 




                                                           
19 Subramanian and Wei (2007, p. 173) point out that, “Although developing countries’ bound tariffs may have 
come down in the Uruguay Round, actual tariffs barely budged…[A]lthough the percentage of tariff lines for which 
bindings (commitments) were taken on by developing countries increased by 50 percentage points due to the 
Uruguay Round, the actual tariff reductions brought about by the Round were much smaller: only 28 percent of 
tariff lines involved reductions in applied tariffs, and on these, the reduction was 8 percent. In other words, if tariff 
reductions are calculated on all tariff lines, the reduction would be about 2 percent…The irony relating to [SDT] in 
the Uruguay Round was that it was eliminated in areas—such as TRIPs—where maintaining it may actually have 
been welfare-enhancing. But [SDT] was preserved in the conventional area of trade liberalization in goods where its 
dilution would have been welfare-enhancing.” 
 
  133   Alternatives for Enforcing WTO Commitments in Poor Countries 
As with most systems of justice, one sign that the system is working well is that it isn’t being 
used at all, i.e., the threat of enforcement alone is sufficient to induce compliance. In the case of 
enforcement of trade liberalization, the best approach would be for developing economies to 
adopt domestic institutions and create domestic alignment of incentives to minimize the amount 
of external enforcement needed. For example, domestic legislators could write trade remedy 
statutes that allow domestic consuming industries to have an equal say to the domestic producers 
in the process. This structure would permit many of the battles to be hashed out internally.
20 
It is unrealistic to expect policymakers and negotiators to write “complete” contracts that 
cover all future contingencies without need for some form of enforcement.
21 Thus, there will be 
instances in which it is efficient for governments to breach the provisions of a trade agreement 
contract, in which case a litigation system is needed for mediation. The question is how to do this 
efficiently in the context of a self-enforcing trading system where sovereign states are voluntary 
participants. 
 
3.1  A “tough love” or outsourcing model of WTO enforcement? 
Absent the alignment of interests generated by the optimal construction of domestic institutions 
to minimize the need for external enforcement, it is instructive to consider a thought experiment: 
what would it take under the current WTO system of dispute settlement and political-economic 
incentives to enforce the commitments of poor countries? 
                                                           
20 Developing countries would need to do better at creating such a balance via their domestic institutions than has 
been the case for many developed countries. For example, in developed economies such as the US and EU there is 
no explicit consumer interest provision that serves as a counter-weight when domestic producer interests demand 
protection from imports under antidumping or safeguard laws. One approach would be to adopt the principle of 
“direct effect” through which domestic actors could challenge their government’s compliance with international 
obligations in domestic courts. A related approach, adopted by many bilateral investment treaties, allows domestic 
economic actors (e.g., firms) to sue a foreign government directly for failure to comply with investment treaty 
obligations, thus bypassing the need for the domestic actor to convince the domestic government to act on its behalf, 
as is currently the situation at the WTO. Levy and Srinivasan (1996) argue that if a domestic industry would have 
automatic ability to file such disputes (without its government acting as a buffer) this might adversely affect the 
obligations the domestic government is willing to take on in prior stage negotiations. As both approaches require 
systemic changes to either WTO dispute settlement rules or domestic legal interface with WTO law, we do not 
pursue a discussion of the issues raised by them. 
 
21 Indeed, Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2006) present an economic theory examining elements of the GATT/WTO 
agreements from the perspective of an incomplete contract. Including safeguards in the GATT/WTO as an “escape 
valve” is one place where scholars have noted the importance of allowing for an ex ante exception that there are then 
economic efficiency reasons against using ex post. See the discussions in Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) and also 
Bagwell and Staiger (2005). 
  14  Since the WTO requires government-to-government adjudication of issues, there must be 
a WTO member willing to challenge a poor country through the DSU in order to generate the 
implementation of negotiated commitments. As DSU litigation is resource costly, this WTO 
member needs to be relatively wealthy. Moreover, since such litigation against a poor country is 
likely to have some political costs, the WTO member would need a flawless reputation as a 
development-friendly country so it can credibly deflect allegations that it is acting in a self-
serving manner. It also cannot have a substantial market access interest in the developing country 
respondent, again to make clear that its complainant role in the dispute is for non-selfish 
reasons.
22 For the purposes of compensation/retaliation, this hypothetical country will also need 
to import from the developing country respondent so it has some capacity to make credible 
retaliatory threats, as this is needed to mobilize export interests in the developing country to 
convince the domestic government to live up to its import market commitments.
23 
  Not surprisingly, few countries would satisfy all of these criteria. Switzerland could be 
one of the closer candidates, so for simplicity we refer to this as the “Swiss Model” of enforcing 
developing country WTO commitments. While this clearly will never happen, it is important to 
recognize that the current WTO system requires something like this to assure enforcement of the 
commitments of poor countries.
24 
 
3.2  Bolstering the current approach by changing incentives? 
Even without any radical systemic changes to the DSU or a WTO member willing and able to 
play the required role in the “Swiss Model,” there will be some cases involving poor country 
respondents that do make it to the WTO. For example, to the extent that the adversely affected 
                                                           
22  This ignores any DSU requirements/conditions/expectations that complainants need to have a market access 
interest at stake. 
 
23 This relates to some extent to the issues raised in Maggi (1999), though Maggi’s point was to illustrate that under 
the WTO as a multilateral institution, multilateral retaliation could be used to enforce lower cooperative tariffs in the 
presence of bilateral imbalances of power – something that economists have been proposing for decades. In our 
context, the bilateral “imbalance” is the inability of one WTO member to challenge another, perhaps because of 
political or resource cost relative to market access gains. Another country could work on its “behalf” to lead to an 
improved outcome.  This is also related to the idea of tradable retaliation rights discussed in Bagwell, Mavroidis and 
Staiger (2006). 
 
24 Furthermore, in the more general equilibrium sense, when a “Swiss model” country is considering where to 
allocate its development assistance resources, it is not clear that the returns to DSU litigation are larger than the 
returns the country would achieve by choosing to invest in development somewhere else. 
 
  15foreign exporting country is another developing country, thus reducing the political costs relative 
to a potential dispute involving a developed country as complainant, there are some resources 
available to help that poor country complainant pursue a WTO case. There is the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) and also the possibility for private sector engagement by pro 
bono attorneys and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that may be willing to assist a 
developing country government in pursuing its case at the WTO.
25 However, as we describe 
elsewhere in substantial detail (Bown and Hoekman, 2005), at best this is only a partial solution 
to the problem. Furthermore, depending on the form of the legal assistance and the funding 
source or needs of the provider, the resulting bias in the distribution of cases brought forward for 
litigation might not necessarily be in alignment with the welfare interests of the developing 
countries involved. 
  An alternative could be to pursue the idea of a “small claims” procedure in the WTO for 
cases involving relatively small amounts of trade and thus not giving rise to a great enough 
incentive to use WTO dispute settlement. The premise is to put in place simplified procedures so 
as to reduce the costs associated with going to the WTO. As discussed in depth by Nordström 
and Shaffer (2007), there are a number of challenges that will need to be addressed in 
operationalizing this idea, including obtaining agreement on who has access, for what types of 
cases, and ensuring that a two-tier system does not give rise to inconsistent case law.  
Another option could be for organizations and institutions outside the WTO to play a role 
in enforcing WTO commitments. Perhaps the most obvious candidates are the IMF and World 
Bank, which could in theory make the provision of financial assistance conditional upon the 
enforcement of WTO obligations. In practice this is not possible, as the IMF and World Bank  
are precluded from imposing such “cross-conditionality” by a provision inserted into the Final 
Act of the Uruguay Round agreement at the insistence of developing countries seeking to 
preclude exactly such issue linkage. Furthermore, this prohibition was supported by the agencies 
concerned, to avoid being required to “enforce” WTO rules and disciplines when these might not 
                                                           
25 Indeed, in one of the few disputes in which a low income economy was challenged as a respondent (India - Anti-
Dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh, DS306), the complainant Bangladesh was another low income 
economy that received legal assistance from the ACWL (ACWL, 2006). 
  
  16be considered priority areas for action by the governments concerned. However, such a 
constraint is not binding upon bilateral donors.
26 
Most far-reaching in terms of changing the status quo would be to enhance the role of the 
WTO Secretariat in enforcement of commitments by giving it a mandate to prosecute cases (e.g., 
Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000). This would deal with the incentive problems associated with 
both the costs and expected benefits of bringing cases that afflict the concerned firms and 
governments. This option is politically infeasible to implement, as most WTO members do not 
desire to give the Secretariat such a mandate or the tools to execute it. However, some steps in 
this direction, taking the form of enhancing the capacity of the WTO to identify instances of non-
compliance, may be feasible. We discuss these below. 
 
4    Transparency as a Substitute for “Tough Love” 
The problems and failures with reliance on formal dispute settlement procedures to enforce poor 
country commitments imply a need to consider alternative mechanisms that induce compliance 
with WTO obligations. In order to be effective, any such mechanism must target domestic 
constituencies and the membership of the WTO as a whole. Greater transparency is critical to 
prevent capture of policies by interest groups, to make policies contestable, and to give both 
winners and losers a greater voice in policy formation. There is thus a role for international 
institutions and development assistance to intermediate through the creation of procedures that 
allow affected groups with a trading interest and their domestic governments to learn about the 
effect of policies and the trade-offs of various policy options.  With some adaptation, there is 
significant potential for stronger transparency and communication mechanisms to help address 
the economic problems associated with the weak incentives for enforcement associated with 
current dispute settlement procedures. 
 
4.1   The WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism  
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) is the primary vehicle used by WTO members for 
periodic review of trade-related policies, the frequency of reviews depending on the relative 
                                                           
26 External conditionality can be effective. Wei and Zhang (2006) present evidence that external interventions (IMF 
trade reform conditionality) are associated with increased trade in developing countries. They find a positive average 
effect of trade reforms on trade openness of developing countries, though the effect appears driven by countries 
willing to reform. 
  17importance of a member in world trade. While large traders such as the EU and the US are 
reviewed on a bi-annual basis, some developing countries and transition economies have yet to 
be reviewed more than 10 years after the entry into force of the WTO. Given that it is poor 
countries that presumably would benefit the most from a review, the current system’s periodicity 
and sequencing may be inappropriate. Clearly this is also true from the perspective of the 
enforcement problem that is the subject of this paper.  
By the end 2005, the TPRM had conducted 212 reviews since its formation, covering 123 
out of 148 Members at that time (WTO, 2005). A total of 23 such reviews were completed for 
least developed countries between 1998 and 2005. Such reviews have increasingly performed a 
technical assistance function, thus also aiming to increase the governments’ understanding of 
prevailing trade policies and their relationship with the WTO Agreements.  Since 2000, the 
review process for a least developed country (LDC) includes a three-to-four-day seminar for 
local officials on the WTO and the trade-policy review exercise. This could be expanded to 
include greater engagement with the private sector and local think tanks, and more involvement 
of such groups in the preparation and dissemination of the analysis.
27 
While there are therefore welfare-motivated arguments for a more frequent and in-depth 
analysis of trade policies in all WTO members, we argue that this is especially the case for 
LDCs, as they do not face the same level of extra-WTO scrutiny from academics, think tanks and 
research institutes that economies such as the US and EU face with respect to their trade policies. 
Nevertheless, we recognize the political limitations of any proposal that the WTO take on the 
role of initiating member country-specific scrutiny. In the next section we consider ways of 
reforming the TPRM to induce international cooperation that may make additional monitoring 
more politically palatable. Then, in the following section, we propose a role for additional 
monitoring and cooperation that would take place outside of the WTO framework. 
An expanded role for the TPRM may be politically palatable to the membership if it 
actually moves beyond simple monitoring to create a focal point for a constructive, as opposed to 
an adversarial, interaction between governments. A TPRM that acts as an intermediary by not 
only collecting information, but also assessing the effects of policies within and across countries, 
                                                           
27 One might ask: why the WTO, and not other international organizations? One answer is that trade policy is not a 
consistent focus of the activities of international financial and development organizations. A major advantage of the 
WTO is that trade and trade-related policies are its core business. 
 
  18would then be more likely to provide to trade constituencies useful information that will help 
identify national priorities for domestic reform. Such a constructive approach could do much to 
raise the domestic profile of the trade agenda in developing countries as well as better focus 
resources (development assistance) across countries by helping to identify where public 
investments and international assistance are most needed.
28  
Furthermore, if the process also included monitoring the delivery and effectiveness of the 
development assistance targeted to address the trade-related priorities of the country under 
review, the TPRM process could help make WTO deliberations and “enforcement” more 
politically balanced.  Rather than an adversarial approach that solely challenged the policies and 
market access granted by a specific Member, the debate and discussion would also focus on what 
richer Members could and did do to assist the country in question, both through market access-
related policies and official development assistance. 
    A 2006 WTO taskforce on “aid for trade” proposed more regular monitoring of the 
development assistance that Members provide to developing countries in the trade area, and 
indeed it also suggested the TPRM as a mechanism that could do deliver this function (WTO, 
2006c). It is therefore not just an academic notion that formal dispute settlement as an 
enforcement tool is too narrow an approach and needs to be complemented by “carrots” such as 
development assistance. 
 
4.2   The WTO committee structures and “soft law” forms of cooperation 
As stressed in a number of analyses of the WTO as an institution (e.g., Hoekman and Kostecki, 
2001), a major role of the WTO is to provide a forum for communication and interchange on 
trade-related policies. Many potential disputes and problems relating to implementation of 
agreements are raised and addressed in the many committees and groups that deal with the 
substantive policy areas covered by WTO agreements. The TPRM is just one input into such 
regular exchange of information, albeit the most wide-ranging in terms of policies covered. The 
various bodies put in place by and supported by the WTO that deal with the various agreements 
are mechanisms through which governments can put problems on the table, raise concerns and 
seek assistance. They also provide fora in which regulators and policymakers can learn from 
each others’ experience (Hoekman, 2005; Scott, 2006). 
                                                           
28 See Hoekman and Mattoo (2007) for a more extensive discussion of this idea with respect to services. 
  19 
4.3    A commitment to transparency outside of the WTO 
Political realities may limit how much monitoring and cooperation/communication can actually 
take place within the WTO itself. Therefore, greater efforts to ensure transparency should go 
beyond the WTO. In this section of the paper we consider who else could be involved in this 
monitoring function before then turning to a discussion of what information is most useful for 
such organizations to provide. 
Research institutes, think tanks, and public interest bodies should engage in monitoring 
and evaluation of policies at the country level.  Such entities could also explore the economic 
and social aspects of particularly contentious issues or proposed areas for action at the WTO or 
in a preferential trade agreement context (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000), helping to generate 
information and build consensus on policy priorities.  A regional entity that can coordinate with 
national think tanks and institutes may be the best model for this role. A combination of an 
independent regional “hub” institution that provides research support to a network of national 
think tanks and governments and works with them would help reduce the overhead costs of 
national entities by providing access to inputs such as databases and specialized information.  
    One of the lessons that can drawn from the World Bank report Doing Business is that 
transparency can have a powerful effect in focusing the attention of policymakers on specific 
issues, especially if pursued in a way that generates data that allow cross-country comparability 
and monitoring of changes over time. Doing Business has become an influential focal point for 
national policymakers, in part because it generates data on specific measures that resonate with 
firms and industries in the private sector, as well as with government officials. Examples are the 
number of days it takes a package to clear customs, or the time it takes for a standardized 
container to move from the factory floor to the nearest port. 
    When it comes to the issue of trade policy enforcement and surveillance of WTO-type 
commitments, it is important to recognize that such monitoring needs a substantive focus that 
goes beyond a technical analysis of legal compliance. Making trade agreements relevant for poor 
countries requires a convincing argument as to how WTO commitments can raise economic 
welfare. While it may be too difficult to accurately and expeditiously relate a particular policy 
change to changes in economic welfare, a first step would be calculation and regular reporting of 
simple measures of industrial structure and trade performance used to characterize the 
  20“conditions of competition” that prevail in an economy. Although such structure and 
performance data are not policy-specific, they can be employed to bolster monitoring and 
surveillance (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998) provided by the WTO. This type of outcome 
monitoring is distinct from an evaluation of the impact of specific policies as it makes no attempt 
at matching outcomes to policies. However, it is a useful complement to policy monitoring and 
assessment by providing information on the state of trade and competition. 
    Indicators such as import penetration ratios, changes in market structure and the size 
distribution of firms, measures of entry and exit over a given period, domestic industry 
concentration ratios or Herfindahl indices, and data on trends in price-cost margins all suffer 
from the same drawback: it is difficult to relate any of these measures unambiguously to a 
specific policy or change in that policy. Nonetheless, such measures provide information on the 
effect of the set of prevailing policies and have the virtue of being easy to calculate. They also do 
not require the use of models or calculation of indices that require (political) acceptance of a set 
of underlying assumptions.  If used in regular multi-country exercises on the basis of identical 




Developing countries are rarely challenged in formal WTO litigation for failing to live up to 
WTO commitments and obligations. While this lack of enforcement activity can be explained in 
part by the fact that developing countries have made fewer commitments than developed ones, 
there are numerous WTO disciplines independent of tariff bindings that apply to developing 
countries. These include disciplines ranging from rules on products standards to customs 
valuation. The weak incentives for trading partners to enforce commitments reduce the relevance 
of the WTO for trade constituencies in all countries, but especially those in developing 
economies. 
While the first-order cost of failing to enforce WTO commitments in poor countries falls 
on consumers within these countries who do not realize the economic welfare gains associated 
with importing, there are dynamic and externality costs as well. The enforcement failure likely 
has a dynamic cost of creating disincentives to negotiate additional, welfare-enhancing WTO 
commitments. First, there is little incentive for constituencies in the developing country that 
might gain from trade to organize politically in order to mobilize support for commitments. 
  21Second, there is little incentive for foreign governments to negotiate reciprocal concessions with 
even large developing countries in the first place, even if this will help them escape from a 
terms-of-trade driven prisoner’s dilemma, if the resulting political environment does not 
accommodate the need for enforcement. Finally, failure to enforce poor country WTO 
commitments also ignores the identity of the potential foreign beneficiaries associated with 
increased enforcement. For example, there is evidence to suggest that other poor countries may 
be among the major exporting producers that stand to benefit from the increased market access 
associated with the liberalization commitments that need to be enforced. In such instances, the 
failure to enforce a poor country’s WTO commitments on the import side may have a 
disproportionately adverse effect on poor country exporters as well. 
The failure to challenge poor countries for not abiding by WTO rules and commitments 
may also indicate that these countries do not realize the positive externality benefits associated 
with full participation in the institution. First, involvement as a respondent in WTO dispute 
settlement may induce learning and lead the country to more active engagement in other disputes 
as a complainant or interested third party in defending export market access interests. Second, a 
successful challenge of a developing country may result in the government undertaking a public 
effort to comply with WTO commitments, which may positively affect the probability that other 
countries also conform to WTO rulings, thus benefiting the developing country’s own export 
market access interests. Managing a balanced portfolio of WTO litigation – undertaking some 
cases from which the country will benefit (by legally winning) as complainants as well as being 
confronted in other cases from which the country will benefit (by legally losing) as respondents – 
can help governments to maintain public support for WTO engagement.  
The basic motivation for this paper is that in the absence of credible enforcement, trade 
interests in the countries signing agreements do not have incentives to push for liberalization 
which attenuates the positive dynamics of reciprocity. The WTO’s reciprocity principle is not 
just limited to negotiating rounds of liberalization – it also plays an important role after the 
negotiations are done.  Small, poor countries do not have much negotiating leverage, as 
reciprocal exchange of market access concessions is not a game they can play effectively.
29 The 
                                                           
29 This was one of the rationales for SDT for developing countries. Given that small countries cannot negotiate 
access to export markets, the MFN principle is particularly important for them in generating export benefits from 
multilateral trade rounds. As this may not generate better access in products that matter to developing countries, the 
GSP can be seen as a mechanism to enhance such access. 
  22weakness of reciprocity dynamics is sometimes argued to imply that the major source of 
potential gain for many small developing countries is the use of trade agreements as credibility-
enhancing or lock-in mechanisms.  But this rationale may be weaker in practice than often 
claimed in the literature for the same market access-related reason: because they are small and 
poor, credibility cannot derive from the threat of external enforcement of trade agreements by 
trading partners. Making the WTO DSU mechanism work for these countries requires that 
foreign governments deliberately pursue enforcement actions even if they have no market access 
incentive to do so. The likelihood that countries can pursue such “tough love” in a credible 
manner is low, and the political feasibility of this possibility appears to be very limited. 
Credibility must therefore be sought in other instruments, such as greater and more 
effective transparency mechanisms. A major advantage of additional monitoring and analysis of 
developing country policies that affect trade is that this can be a valuable input into improved 
domestic policies. What is needed is that the constituencies in these countries see implementation 
of commitments as being in their interest. Often that will require a period of gradual learning 
about the benefits and the costs of different regulatory approaches, interactions with other 
countries and learning from their experience, and building up the required institutions needed to 
enforce the regulations that are developed. Rather than rely on binding commitments and the 
threat of the DSU, an approach that focuses on transparency and analysis of the effects of 
policies in such regulatory areas may do more to bolster ownership and identify where 
multilateral commitments can be beneficial. An additional argument in favor of this approach is 
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  26Table 1. WTO Trade Disputes 1995-2006, by Income Group 
 
    




    
    
Total low-income economies    20    21 
    
 Bangladesh  0  1 
 India  18  17 
 Pakistan  2  3 
    
Total lower-middle-income economies    46    65 
    
 Brazil  13  22 
 China  4  1 
 Colombia  2  4 
 Dominican  Republic  3  0 
 Ecuador  3  3 
 Egypt  4  0 
 Guatemala  2  6 
 Honduras  0  6 
 Indonesia  4  3 
 Nicaragua  2  1 
 Peru  4  2 
 Philippines  4  4 
 Sri  Lanka  0  1 
 Thailand  1  12 
    
Total upper-middle-income economies    69    59 
    
Total high-income economies    217    235 
    
    
Total   352  380 
    
Notes: WTO trade dispute from www.wto.org. The income group categories are taken from the World 
Bank’s classification based on 2005 GNI per capita calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
The groups are: low income, $875 or less; lower middle income, $876 - $3,465; upper middle income, 
$3,466 - $10,725; and high income, $10,726 or more. 
 
  27Table 2.  Developed and Developing Country Use of Antidumping and DSU Challenges, 1995-2005 
 
Country 








Number of Challenges  
to New Antidumping 
Investigations Under  
the DSU 
      
Total developed economy 
antidumping users  1169 687  66 
      
 Australia    179  67  1 
 Canada    134  84  1 
 European  Union  327  219  5 
  United States   366  234  58* 
 Other  developed  economies  163  83  1 
      
Total developing economy 
antidumping users  1671 1117  69 
      
 Argentina    204  147  4 
 Brazil    122  66  1 
   China  123  68  0 
   Colombia  27  12  0 
 Egypt  50  30  1 
 India    425  316  39** 
 Indonesia  60  27  0 
 Malaysia  35  25  0 
 Mexico    85  76  7 
 Pakistan  12  8  0 
 Peru  60  40  2 
 Philippines  17  9  1 
 South  Africa    197  113  5 
 Thailand  34  27  1 
 Turkey    101  86  1 
 Venezuela  31  25  1 
Other developing economies  88  42  6 
      
      
      
Total 2840  1804  135 
      
 
Note:   Data for the initiations and measures used in this table compiled by the author from WTO (2006a,b). The data 
on WTO disputes is compiled by the author and is available as 
http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/global_ad/data_files/DSU-WTO-v2.1.xls in Bown (2006b). *The 58 US 
antidumping investigations were challenged under 26 different case groupings by 10 different countries.  **The 
39 Indian antidumping investigations were challenged under three different DSU case groupings by 3 different 
countries– the EU (DS304) challenging 31 investigations, Bangladesh (DS306) challenging 1 investigation and 
Taiwan (DS318) challenging 7 investigations. 
 
 
  28Table 3.  WTO Trade Disputes over Trade Remedies, 1995-2006 
Respondent Trade Policy under Dispute  Disputes Initiated 
Between 1995 and 1998 
Disputes Initiated 
Between 1999 and 2006* 
    
Antidumping law, practice or measure*  13  53 
Countervailing duty law, practice or measure  4  13 
Other trade remedy law, practice or measure 
(e.g., safeguards)  4  30 
Total trade remedy disputes  21  96 
    
    
Other non-trade remedy disputes  133  102 
    
    
Total disputes (352)  154  198 
    
 
Note:   *For a dispute challenging more than one type of trade remedy (e.g., both an imposed antidumping measure and 
a countervailing duty), we avoid double-counting by entering it as challenging one type of trade remedy only 
(typically, an antidumping measure). 
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Share of import 
market in 2000 (rank) 
Antidumping investigations 
(share of total) 
Investigations resulting in 
measures (share of target 
country’s investigations) 
Argentina  1. China  4.4%  (4) 38  (22%) 33 (87%)
 2.  Brazil  25.9%  (1) 33  (19%) 22 (67%)
 3.  EU  22.9%  (2) 21  (12%) 10 (48%)
 4.  South  Africa  0.3%  (23) 10  (6%) 6  (60%)
 5.  Korea  2.1%  (8) 10  (6%) 8  (80%)
   All  other 44.3% 85    (48%) 58 (68%)
   Total  100.0%  176  124    (70%) 
Brazil  1. China  2.3%  (8) 24  (19%) 18 (75%)
  2. EU  25.0%  (1) 18  (14%) 13 (72%)
 3.  USA  23.2%  (2) 18  (14%) 7  (39%)
 4.  India  0.5%  (25) 8  (6%) 5  (63%)
 5.  South  Africa  0.4%  (27) 5  (4%) 3  (60%)
   All  other 48.7% 56    (43%) 16 (29%)
   Total  100.0% 129 62 (48%)
India  1. China  3.0%  (5) 66  (19%) 59 (89%)
 2.  EU  20.8%  (1) 49  (14%) 40 (82%)
 3.  Taiwan  1.0%  (16) 28  (8%) 22 (79%)
 4.  Korea  1.8%  (11) 25  (7%) 21 (84%)
 5.  USA  6.0%  (3) 19  (5%) 15 (79%)
   All  other 67.5% 164    (47%) 135 (82%)
   Total  100.0% 351 292 (83%)
Mexico  1. USA  73.3%  (1) 21  (28%) 16 (76%)
 2.  China  1.7%  (6) 13  (17%) 12 (92%)
 3.  EU  8.5%  (2) 7  (9%) 2  (29%)
 4.  Russia  0.0%  (41) 6  (8%) 5  (83%)
 5.  Ukraine  0.0%  (35) 5  (7%) 5  (100%)
   All  other 16.6% 23    (31%) 15 (65%)
   Total  100.0% 75 55 (73%)
Turkey  1. China  2.4%  (5) 44  (44%) 40  (91%)
  2. Taiwan  1.0%  (14) 11  (11%) 10 (91%)
 3.  Thailand  0.4%  (25) 8  (8%) 6  (75%)
 4.  Korea  2.2%  (7) 6  (6%) 5  (83%)
 5.  India  0.8%  (18) 6  (6%) 5  (83%)
   All  other 93.2% 25    (25%) 19 (76%)
        
   Total  100.0% 100 85 (85%)
 
Note:   Antidumping data compiled from Bown (2006b). Import data from COMTRADE. *For consistency, this table only allows for one 
“EU” entry for each product-specific investigation, hence total number of investigations and imposed measures may differ from 
table 2 due to aggregation of EU member cases per investigation. 
  